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 Despite the increasing availability of mobile devices offering handheld peer to 
peer communication capabilities, interoperability between heterogeneous mobile device 
platforms is hampered by the security requirements of their underlying operating systems.  
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) was introduced so that mobile devices could read from 
sensors with fewer security requirements, presenting an opportunity to allow disparate 
devices to connect and transfer data. 
 This paper presents a message transfer framework to facilitate arbitrary data 
transfer using the GATT mechanisms as provided by BLE in the Bluetooth 4.0 
specification.  The provided implementation library and applications for Android along 
with a proof of concept application for iOS 8 sustain reliable transfer speeds of 1 KB/s, 
allowing for a 100KB  payload (a small picture, for example) to be sent wirelessly 
between an Android and iOS device in just over a minute. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 With almost ubiquitous access to the internet, users of smart mobile devices have 
come to rely on infrastructure for communication.  However there are times when 
infrastructure cannot serve the requirements of the user, such as disaster scenarios [1], an 
unreliable signal (either in the developing world or a large building), or a saturated 
wireless spectrum such as at a large music festival [2].  Users may also want to avoid 
infrastructure to preserve their privacy from malicious actors or government overreach 
[3], or continue to communicate when mobile infrastructure access has been blocked [4]. 
 As mobile devices gain more functionality and attention in the lower-end and 
developing world markets, more consumers will have access to communication features 
that were previously reserved for higher end hardware.  For example, Google recently 
announced their Android One project to sell affordable smartphones in Asia [5].  Android 
One compliant phones implement a Google-approved reference design [6] which includes 
Bluetooth 4.0 and Wi-Fi Direct compliance.  In the United States, Motorola sells the 
Moto E (used as the primary development device for this paper) which ships with 
Android 5.0.  As mobile devices with improved hardware and software approach 
commodity, so too does the mobile device ecosystem approach a more functional base 
level of inter-device communication capabilities. 
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 Android provides built-in applications allowing two devices to transfer files using 
NFC (the “Beam” application) or Bluetooth (once these devices have paired).  Android 
also provides programmatic access for peer to peer connectivity via its APIs for NFC, 
Wi-Fi Direct and Bluetooth [7].  iOS provides AirDrop for file transfer to other iOS 
devices.  iOS also provides programmatic access to similar functionality via its MultiPeer 
Connectivity API, an abstraction interface for peer to peer connectivity that uses Wi-Fi or 
Bluetooth to communicate with “nearby iOS devices” [8].  With the peer to peer support 
provided by both of these major mobile platforms, transmitting a small amount of 
information from one device directly to another should be trivial. 
1.2 Problem 
 The baked-in applications on iOS and Android, while they allow simple transfer 
between homogeneous platforms, do not allow an iOS device to send data directly to an 
Android device (or vice-versa).  The programmatic APIs offer no relief; even though 
Android provides lower level access to peer to peer communication protocols, a 
developer still cannot write an application to communicate directly with an iOS device 
due to the previously noted restriction that MultiPeer Connectivity API enforces to only 
connect with iOS devices. 
 Both platforms offer Bluetooth support, a technology for exchanging data over 
short distances.  Primarily used as a way to communicate with peripheral devices such as 
headsets and keyboards, Bluetooth also offers the capability for devices to transmit data 
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between each other.  While Android devices can use Bluetooth to transfer files and 
arbitrary data, iOS does not support the Bluetooth profile necessary to transfer data [9].  
Thus as a method of data transfer, classic Bluetooth is relegated to the realm of being 
proprietary per OS, and no more interoperable than a technology like Android’s WiFi p2p 
or iOS’s MultiPeer Connectivity API.  Since Android has 80% of the worldwide market 
[10] one could almost assume that writing an application specifically for Android would 
provide sufficient market penetration – however in the US and Europe market share is 
much more evenly split between iOS and Android devices [11]. 
1.3 Vision 
   Bluetooth Low Energy (commonly abbreviated BLE) was added to the 
Bluetooth 4.0 specification and was designed for a handheld device to gather data from a 
sensor.  Chips were designed to be cheap to manufacture, low power so that sensors can 
remain in place for long periods of time, and use an open and simple protocol to make it 
easy for devices to communicate. Authentication and encryption, while offered, are not 
required for connectivity. 
 Starting with the iPhone 4S, iOS 5 was able to act as a handheld BLE scanner as 
well as impersonate a remote sensor providing data.  Starting with Android 4.3, Android 
devices were able to act as a handheld BLE scanner, and with Android 5.0, new Android 
devices gained the ability to act as a remote sensor providing data.  With mobile devices 
gaining the capability to act as these roles (that of scanner and that of sensor), any mobile 
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OS adhering to the Bluetooth 4.0 standard gained the ability to transfer information to 
another compliant OS using BLE. 
1.4 Hurdles 
 Because BLE was designed to pull readings from sensors, it was optimized to 
transmit small amounts of data at close proximity, with the bulk of the data originating 
from the sensor and not the reader.  Thus data transfer rates between two devices will be 
asymmetric, where the device acting as a sensor will be able to transfer outbound data at 
a higher rate than the device acting as a reader. 
 While the iOS BLE implementation is well established, the Android 
implementation is new and approximately only half of Android devices currently support 
BLE, with only 5% supporting the ability to impersonate a sensor [12]. 
 While classic Bluetooth has long been established as a secure transfer medium, 
BLE as specified by the Bluetooth 4.0 specification has a weak encryption handshake that 
is exploitable [13].  As with classic Bluetooth, pairing takes place at the OS level and 
cannot be handled by an application. 
1.5 Scope and Report Organization 
 This report will describe a framework, SimpBLE, which provides for the transfer 
of arbitrary data using Bluetooth Low Energy constructs as a transport layer.  This report 
will provide an implementation library compatible with Android versions 4.3 through 5.1, 
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popular use cases a developer might choose to implement, and finally Android 
implementations of SimpBLE that demonstrate the feasibility of using common consumer 
grade Android devices for message communication, secure and otherwise.  Compatible 
transport-level mechanisms will be implemented on iOS to demonstrate the feasibility 
and performance of cross-platform communication over BLE. 
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Chapter 2 – Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) 
 Detailing the lower level implementation details of Bluetooth Low Energy is 
outside the scope of this paper.  However a valid understanding of how devices 
communicate over BLE will help the reader appreciate the utility of SimpBLE.  The 
following description is thus meant to be informative but not exhaustive. 
2.1 High Level Description of Bluetooth Low Energy 
 For the purposes of this report, the layers of Bluetooth Low Energy from a 
software developer’s perspective are distilled in Figure 2.1 (adapted from [14] and [15]). 
 
Figure 2.1 – Bluetooth Low Energy Protocol Layers 
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2.1.1 Link Layer / Physical Layer 
 As with Classic Bluetooth, BLE operates in the 2.4 GHz ISM band.  However 
BLE divides this spectrum into 40 channels of 2 MHz each (instead of 79 channels of 1 
MHz each).  Of these 40 channels, 3 are for advertising services and are positioned at 
2402, 2426, 2480 MHz to avoid interference with the most commonly used 802.11 
frequencies.  The 37 remaining channels are assigned for data transmission, using 
Adaptive Frequency Hopping to rapidly switch channels to avoid interference. 
2.1.2 L2CAP 
 The Logical Link Control and Adaption Layer Protocol (L2CAP) is responsible 
for multiplexing the data it receives from the higher layer protocols and communicating 
with the Link Layer below it. 
2.1.3 GAP 
 The Generic Access Profile (GAP) is responsible for the logical connection 
functionality for the BLE stack, governing how devices connect with each other.  GAP 
defines four roles of Central, Peripheral, Observer, and Broadcaster.  Broadcaster and 
Observer roles do not allow connections so this paper will focus on the connection and 
data transfer capabilities of the Central and Peripheral roles. 
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2.1.4  SM 
 The Security Manager (SM) provides crytographic methods for encryption and 
authentication that can be used by the other layers for secure communication through the 
Security Manager Protocol (SMP).  The SMP encryption layer in BLE uses AES-128 
with a CCM encryption engine, which for session encryption is secure as there are no 
practical attacks.  However the key exchange was designed by the Bluetooth SIG and 
isn’t a standard well tested protocol as with Diffie-Hellmann. It has been shown to be 
flawed as the Temporary Key (TK) can be brute forced in less than one second on an 
Intel i7 [13].   Once the TK is determined the subsequent keys are trivial to find. 
2.1.5 ATT and GATT  
 The Generic Attribute Profile (GATT)  is the framework that BLE uses to store 
and transfer data.   A device in the GAP role of Peripheral traditionally hosts a GATT 
Server, which maintains a database of information ready for consumption.  Traditionally 
a GATT Client in the Central role interfaces with the GATT Server to pull data formatted 
as Attributes (as provided for by the Bluetooth 4.0 specification).  These role 
combinations are common enough that the terms Central and Client are often used 
interchangeably, as are the terms Peripheral and Server. 
 To communicate with the GATT Server and consume the data provided by these 
Attributes, the Bluetooth 4.0 specification requires the Attribute Protocol (ATT) to be 
implemented for Bluetooth Low Energy.  The GATT Client and Server communicate 
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using the Attribute Protocol, which (as its name suggests) allows for operations on these 
Attributes such that the GATT Client can read data from and write data to the GATT 
Server. 
2.2 The Bluetooth Profile Abstraction 
 To aid in standardization the Bluetooth SIG provides Profiles - definitions for 
common applications and behaviors that these applications should use for 
communication.  The Bluetooth SIG highlights the frequently implemented Heart Rate 
Profile [16] as a common example: a smart phone with a heart rate monitor app scans its 
range for a smart heart rate monitor.  It picks up the heart rate sensor attached to the 
user’s chest strap and subscribes to be notified of heart rate measurements.  The heart rate 
sensor pushes its data to the subscribed monitoring app. The monitoring app can also pull 
the location of the sensor on the body as well as modify control parameters on the sensor 
itself. 
 Because Profiles such as these are standardized, an application developer can 
write the module for a communication interface and be assured that it will work with any 
peripheral whose Bluetooth implementation recognizes and adheres to the same 
advertised Profile. 
 For the BLE specification in particular, the Bluetooth SIG has defined a distinct 
set of Profiles that are considered part of the GATT Profile [17].  These Profiles allow the 
developer of software for a Peripheral device hosting a GATT Server to know how to 
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make a sensor’s data available, the same way these Profiles allow the developer of 
software for a Central device hosting a GATT Client to know where to look for data and 
what contract of data transfer to expect. 
2.3 Services and Characteristics 
 Bluetooth Low Energy Profiles are implemented through GATT Characteristics 
grouped into GATT Services.  In the case of the Heart Rate Profile, the Heart Rate 
Service exposes three Characteristics – Heart Rate Measurement, Body Sensor Location, 
and Heart Rate Control Point. This Service and its Characteristics are forms of Attributes, 
and as such their access is governed by the ATT protocol.  As Attributes, they are also 
identified by 128 bit Universally Unique Identifiers (as defined in ITU-T X.667 and  
ISO/IEC 9834-8).  To facilitate development, Shortcut UUIDs of only 16 bits are 
available for commonly used Services and Characteristics and are provided by the 
Bluetooth SIG; programmatically these are extrapolated to full 128 bit UUIDs using a 
Bluetooth SIG- provided base UUID [18].  Profile specifications reference these UUIDs 
so that developers know what UUIDs to use when building their applications – a 
developer can check the Bluetooth SIG to find that the Heart Rate Service UUID is 
0x180D and the Heart Rate Measurement UUID is 0x2A37. 
 Services are valuable constructs in that they group and make visible 
Characteristics.  The handle to data, however, is provided solely through Characteristics  
that a GATT client can read from or write to, depending on how these characteristics are 
11 
 
configured.   An application developer will implement a GATT Client to search for a 
GATT Service and pull its GATT Characteristics.  The Client will then use the Attribute 
Protocol to act on advertised Characteristics by reading a value, writing a value, or asking 
to be notified by a Peripheral when a value has changed.  These operations form the 
backbone through which devices transfer data using BLE. 
2.4  Using Bluetooth Low Energy 
 The Bluetooth SIG approved GATT based profiles illustrate the kind of services 
that Bluetooth Low Energy was designed for: Blood Pressure, Health Thermometer, 
Heart Rate, Running Speed and Cadence, etc.  All of these demonstrate the intention that 
Bluetooth Low Energy was designed for a Central device with a reasonable amount of 
power to interface with a Peripheral device (providing data) that is meant to be longer 
lived.  BLE was not designed for large amounts of data (the default payload per packet in 
Android is 20 bytes), but rather to achieve the goals of low power consumption and low 
latency. 
2.4.1 Intended functionality, example 
 The use case for a Heart Rate Profile application is implemented as follows: a 
smart phone with a heart rate monitor app assumes the role of Central and scans for 
devices advertising a service with the UUID 0000180D-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB 
(the GATT Heart Rate Service).  The Central finds the heart rate monitor which is 
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advertising this service as a Peripheral, and subscribes to the Characteristic identified by 
UUID 00002A37-0000-1000-8000-00805F9B34FB (the GATT Heart Rate Measurement 
Characteristic) by updating the Heart Rate Measurement Client Characteristic 
Configuration descriptor.  The heart rate sensor updates the value of the subscribed 
Characteristic on its GATT Server, which pushes the updated value to the subscribed 
Central application. 
2.4.2 Extended, Novel Uses 
 Consider this application – one friend wants to send a picture from his Android 
Moto E smartphone to his friend’s iPhone 5.  The Wi-Fi router at the coffee shop where 
the friends are chatting over coffee is out of service and one of the friends has exceeded 
his mobile phone LTE data allotment for the month.  Both friends pull up the same app.  
The Android user selects the picture and scans for the iPhone, which was placed in 
receive mode.  Both phones connect, and the Android phone sends a segmented byte 
stream of the picture in question to the iPhone.  The app on the iPhone re-assembles the 
bytes into a picture file and saves it to the phone’s picture gallery. 
 The popular mobile app FireChat [19] implements the message sending portion of 
the above functionality using Bluetooth Low Energy as part of its “Nearby” Chatroom 
functionality.  Messages are not sent to a particular device, but are sent to a virtual 
chatroom such that any device that is part of this chatroom will receive the  message.  
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Other protocols can be used (via the iOS MultiPeer Connectivity API) if the conversing 
devices are all running iOS. 
 The Kwikset lock company recently released its Kevo Smart Lock for a physical 
door [20].  The Kevo app (available on Android and iOS) uses BLE to control the 
physical Kevo Smart Lock.  It’s capable of unlocking the door with no user interaction, 
advertising in BLE Peripheral mode on a low duty cycle such that the physical lock can 
scan for and find the Kevo app. [see Figure A.1] 
  There are no Bluetooth SIG approved GATT Profiles to enable the above use 
cases.  These software manufacturers instead use their own ad-hoc and unpublished 
Profiles, which is a welcome feature of BLE [21].  Given that the use cases for these 
applications are dissimilar from the SIG approved GATT Profiles, why did these device 
and software manufacturers choose to use BLE?  In the case of FireChat, BLE provides 
the only mechanism through which an iOS and Android device can transfer data.  In the 
case of Kevo, the low power capabilities of BLE allow the batteries in the door lock to 
last a year [22], and allow the user’s phone to constantly advertise on a very low duty 
cycle so that the lock can scan for and detect the phone when in proximity.  Both of these 
applications illustrate currently active applications for data transfer over BLE. 
2.5  Suitability of Bluetooth Low Energy for message transport 
 From a transport perspective, classic Bluetooth BR/EDR is much better suited 
than BLE for transferring data.   BLE has a lower bandwidth and is therefore not as good 
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at transferring large amounts of data.  However for small amounts of data such as email 
and small pictures these drawbacks are not as pronounced.  BLE’s less stringent security 
requirements also facilitate the transfer of non-sensitive data. 
 No Pairing Necessary.  BLE does not require that devices pair to transfer data 
between each other.  By avoiding the need to pair at the OS level, an application can 
choose its preferred and custom method of authentication and encryption.  If 
authentication and encryption are not needed, the application does not have to implement 
these layers. 
 Quick Connections. The Bluetooth SIG indicates that devices can connect and 
transfer data in as little as 3ms [23].  In practice connection and transfer times of just over 
1 second have been observed [24]. 
 Mobile Device Penetration.  The two most prominent mobile operating systems, 
iOS and Android, held over 96% of the worldwide smartphone OS market in 2014 [25].  
iOS and Android themselves present varying levels of Bluetooth  Low Energy support. 
 Apple introduced full BLE support in early 2011.  In early 2015 the app store 
reported that 98% of devices are versions of iOS that support BLE.  In contrast, Android 
only introduced partial BLE support (Central mode) with the second maintenance release 
of version 4.3 (Jelly Bean MR2) in July of 2013.  Android finally introduced full BLE 
support (Peripheral mode) in late 2014 with version 5.0.  As of April 2015 the Google 
Play Store reports Android versions 4.3 through 5.1 hold 50% of the Android market 
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share [12].  Note however that only devices designed at production for Android 5.0 will 
support Peripheral mode; older devices are not guaranteed to gain this functionality [26]. 
 Mobile Device APIs.  The iOS CoreBluetooth API is well established since its 
release in 2011 with iOS 5.  Work from a previous paper [27] demonstrated the 
capabilities of CoreBluetooth, and implementations of iBeacon functionality are now 
implemented commercially [28]. 
 Android’s API Level 18 introduced Bluetooth Low Energy functionality, and API 
Level 21 extended this functionality to match that of iOS’s CoreBluetooth library.   API 
Level 21 (Lollipop) was released in November of 2014 [29]. 
 Good Range for the Power. For traditional Bluetooth, a class 2 device (mobile 
phone, Bluetooth headset) transmitting at 2.5 mW has a range of 10 meters, or 33 feet 
[30]. Experiments with Bluetooth Low Energy with the iPhone 5s have shown reliable 
connectivity at 50 meters [24]. According to the Bluetooth SIG, the range is better than 
traditional Bluetooth due to BLE’s use of a larger GFSK modulation index [23]. 
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Chapter 3 - SimpBLE Design 
 This paper presents the SimpBLE framework to help developers use Bluetooth 
Low Energy as a transport method for arbitrary data.  Android was selected as the 
development language for the initial implementation of SimpBLE due to its market 
penetration worldwide and relative affordability compared with similar iOS devices.  To 
verify compatibility with iOS, a barebones iOS implementation of SimpBLE transport 
methods was implemented for iOS 8.2. 
3.1 GATT Profile Description 
 In the same spirit of standardization that the Bluetooth SIG provides defined 
GATT Profiles, this paper presents the basis for a SimpBLE GATT Profile. This Profile 
defines the roles of Connection Initiator and Connection Responder, where the Initiator is 
a GATT Client and the Responder is a GATT Server.   The Connection Responder will 
provide a Message Transfer Service.  The Service will be identified by the following 
UUID randomly generated from Java’s UUID class: 73A20000-2C47-11E4-8C21-
0800200C9A66.  
 For purposes of clarity, this UUID will also serve as a base for all Characteristics 
used by the Service so that they may be represented by a 16 bit UUID.  Below is a table 
of the Characteristics for the GATT Service that SimpBLE will implement. 
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Message Transfer Service UUID: 73A20000-2C47-11E4-8C21-0800200C9A66 
Characteristic Function 16 bit UUID GATT Type 
DATA_CtoS Write Data from Client to Server  0x0101 WRITE 
DATA_StoC Write Data from Server to Client 0x0102 NOTIFY  
DATA_ACK Acknowledge Receipt of Message 0x0105 READ / 
WRITE  
Table 3.1 - SimpBLE GATT Profile Attributes 
 
The SimpBLE service and associated characteristics will be advertised when SimpBLE is 
invoked in Peripheral mode, and will be scanned for when SimpBLE is invoked in 
Central mode. 
3.2 Architecture 
 SimpBLE attempts to abstract as much Central or Peripheral specific functionality 
as possible, so that these concepts are made transparent to the application’s developer.  
Following are the internal details which must differentiate between the Central and 
Peripheral GAP roles.  The components of the Figure 3.1 are described in this section. 
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Figure 3.1 - SimpBLE Architecture 
3.2.1 Data Objects 
BlePacket.  Represents an individual packet of data at the GATT layer.  An integer to 
track packet sequence is mapped to a byte array which holds the raw bytes of the packet.   
This message sequence integer represents the sequence of that particular packet in terms 
of making up a parent BleMessage. 
BleMessage. Represents a message sent to or received from a BlePeer (described next).  
Contains a collection of BlePackets and methods to construct a full byte array of an entire 
message from these packets as well as methods to packetize the full byte array of an 
entire message into BlePackets. 
BlePeer.  Represents a currently connected GATT Client or GATT Server.  Contains a 
collection of BleMessages which are pending send or are pending completion of receipt, 
as well as methods to act on these. 
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BleGattCharacteristic.  Wrapper for Android’s BluetoothGattCharacteristic which 
allows for custom callbacks that can be applied to each.  Used solely in the layer that 
managers GAP Peripheral operations (BlePeripheral, described in the next section). 
BleCharacteristic.  Used to set the service definition of the GATT Characteristics that 
make up the Service. 
 
3.2.2 Connection Objects and Interfaces 
BleMessenger. Responsible for tracking peers using a collection of type BlePeer.  
Manages connections for and handles callbacks from BleCentral and BlePeripheral 
classes (described next), and as such is responsible for merging and abstracting GATT 
communication activity which would otherwise require direct knowledge of Bluetooth 
GATT characteristics and how these are used with the GAP Central and Peripheral roles. 
BleCentral.  Manages connectivity as a GATT client.  Responds to requests for scanning 
for Peripheral devices from BleMessenger and reports connection and data events back to 
BleMessenger through the BleCentralHandler callback.  Responsible for making direct 
calls to the OS’s API for GAP Central and GATT client operations. 
BlePeripheral.  Manages connectivity as a GATT server.  Creates GATT Service and 
Characteristics as directed by BleMessenger.  Updates Characteristic values as directed 
by BleMessenger.  Responsible for making direct calls to the OS’s API for BLE 
Peripheral and GATT Server operations. 
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BleCentralHandler.   Interface through which BleCentral notifes BleMessenger of 
connection and data events. 
BlePeripheralHandler. Interface through which BlePeripheral notifies BleMessenger of 
connection and data events. 
BleStatusCallback.  Interface through which BleMessenger notifies the calling 
application of connection and data events. 
3.3 Use Cases, Internal Implementation 
 The following describes the internal functionality SimpBLE implements when 
invoked by a calling application to perform common communication use cases. 
3.3.1 Initiating a Connection 
 By design, one peer must act in the Central role and the other must act in the 
Peripheral role.  The design of SimpBLE doesn’t attempt to abstract out the differences 
between a Central and a Peripheral in terms of device discovery.  A developer may intend 
for a device to seek out other devices yet not advertise the presence of the application’s 
own device; conversely a device may want to passively offer data and not wish to 
actively scan for other peers, as the act of scanning takes more power than passively 
advertising at a low power.  Accordingly later when the public interface of SimpBLE is 
described Scan functionality will be separated from Accept functionality.  Figure 3.2 
illustrates the connection steps described in the next two sections. 
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 Central. For the device that enters the Central role, it issues a call to the 
Bluetooth LE adapter to scan for advertising peripherals.  The adapter will filter to only 
connect to those devices that advertise SimpBLE’s Message Transfer Service UUID.  
BleMessenger is notified of this connection via the BleCentralHandler callback, at which 
time it instantiates a new BlePeer object and adds it to a lookup structure, indexed by the 
received Bluetooth address.  Once identified, the Central peer connects to the Peripheral 
and itemizes the characteristics offered.  If the characteristics match the service definition 
noted in Table 3.1, the Central subscribes to the DATA_StoC GATT characteristic by 
writing the appropriate byte value to that Characteristic’s Client Characteristic 
Configuration descriptor to enable notifications. [31]  Upon verification from the 
connected Peripheral that this subscription is successful, SimpBLE considers this peer 
connected and marks the corresponding BlePeer  object as having a data transport open. 
 Peripheral. For the device that assumes the Peripheral role, it begins advertising 
SimpBLE’s Message Transfer Service UUID and associated characteristics.  When 
connected to by a Central device, BleMessenger instantiates a BlePeer object and adds it 
to a map indexed by the Central’s Bluetooth address.  It then waits for the Central to 
subscribe to the DATA_CtoS characteristic, and returns a verification when that 
subscription occurs.  At this point SimpBLE marks this peer as having a data transport 
open. 
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Figure 3.2 - SimpBLE Handshake 
3.3.2 Preparing a Message 
 SimpBLE creates packets of byte size 20 to send to the device’s Bluetooth stack.  
The packet size is derived from the maximum per-packet payload allowed in Android 
versions before 5.0.  The calling application submits a message in a byte array (or a 
helper object) to BleMessenger along with a target peer’s identifier.  BleMessenger 
instantiates a BleMessage object using these bytes and adds it to the appropriate BlePeer.  
The BleMessage object then creates a set of BlePackets, each BlePacket holding a byte 
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array of  data ready for transmission to the recipient.  The layout of the byte array for 
packets used by SimpBLE is provided in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 - SimpBLE Data and Ack Packets 
 
 In each payload packet: SimpBLE uses 1 byte to identify the message for a 
connection session (max 256 messages per connection session), 2 bytes to identify the 
current packet (max 65,536 packets), and 17 bytes for the message payload itself.  Since 
2 bytes are used for the packet counter, there are a maximum of 65,535 packets per 
message (packet 0 is used as the header packet).   At 17 bytes of payload a packet, 
SimpBLE allows for messages of a maximum size of 1,114,095 bytes.  
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3.3.3  Transmitting Packets 
 SimpBLE identifies the target connected peer using the Bluetooth address and 
references the appropriate BlePeer object.  The BlePeer object references its own 
collection of BleMessage objects that have not been sent, and provides a BleMessage 
object to BleMessenger.  Using transport mechanisms as noted below, BleMessenger 
gathers the pending BlePackets from the provided BleMessage and loops over each, 
sending to the target device via the GATT Characteristic as noted below. 
 Transmitting from the Central Role.  The only way for a Central to transmit 
data to a peripheral is by updating the value of a GATT Server’s Write Characteristic, 
noted in Chart 1a as DATA_CtoS.  Since the Bluetooth specification allows a Central to 
be connected to multiple Peripheral peers, the Bluetooth address of the target peripheral 
is necessary to direct each message to the appropriate recipient.  BleMessenger directs the 
BleCentral object to deliver each packet to the DATA_CtoS Characteristic.  There is a 
50ms delay added in between each WRITE operation, as developers have experienced 
problems overwhelming the Android 4.3 Bluetooth stack outgoing data buffer, leading to 
Characteristics not being properly sent.  BleCentral then calls the underlying 
android.bluetooth API to deliver the packet to the target Characteristic on the GATT 
Server. 
 Transmitting from the Peripheral Role.  A Peripheral role has many options to 
transmit data to its Central peer.  SimpBLE uses the Notify attribute, noted in Chart 1a as 
DATA_StoC.  The Indicate attribute was also an option for transfer, however that proved 
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too slow as the Central must acknowledge receipt of each packet for an Indicate.    
 While the Bluetooth 4.0 specification allows a single Central peer to be connected 
to multiple Peripheral peers, a Peripheral can only be connected to a single Central.  
Future versions of Bluetooth have indicated the capability of allowing a Peripheral to 
host multiple Central peers, so BleMessenger uses an index to look up the connected 
peer, although as only a single peer can be connected this strategy is currently 
unnecessary. 
 BleMessenger checks to ensure that the Client device is subscribed to the 
DATA_StoC Characteristic, and then directs the BlePeripheral object to update this 
Characteristic with the byte value of each BlePacket for the message.  The 
android.bluetooth layer then delivers each packet to the subscribed Client device. 
3.3.4  Message Acknowledgment 
 Figure 3.4 illustrates the message acknowledgment process described in this 
section  After a Central completes sending a message to the Peripheral, BleMessenger 
follws up by directing BleCentral to issue a Read request to the Peripheral’s 
DATA_ACK GATT characteristic.  BlePeripheral relays the calling Bluetooth address 
and Characteristic called to BleMessenger, which upon seeing DATA_ACK was called 
looks up the BlePeer via the Bluetooth address and identifies any incoming BleMessages 
for that peer, which it then queries for any missing BlePackets.  An ACK packet detailing 
which BlePackets are missing will be returned.  If any are missing, BleMessenger directs 
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BleMessage to requeue these and will re-send at the next send event.   If none are 
missing, BleMessenger directs BlePeer to mark that particular message as sent. 
 After a Peripheral completes sending a message to the Central, the Central 
initiates the acknowledgment action (as the Central must initiate any connection event).  
Because this action is initiated immediately after a successful receipt, the BleMessage 
object can be referenced directly.  BleMessenger directs BleCentral to issue a Write 
request in the format of an ACK packet to the Peripheral’s DATA_ACK GATT 
Characteristic indicating the message was fully received.  If the message was not fully 
received, then a cleanup routine will identify missing packets and follow up with an ACK 
packet which instead will indicate which packets were not received. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4- Message Acknowledgment 
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3.3.5  Message Receipt 
 Regardless of whether the packet stream is incoming via DATA_StoC or 
DATA_CtoS,  BleMessenger reads the incoming bytes into a BlePacket and uses the 
Bluetooth address to identify the sending peer’s corresponding BlePeer object, using the 
first byte of the packet to identify to which BleMessage that BlePacket belongs.  Based 
on the first BlePacket received for the parent message, a BleMessage knows how many 
packets to expect.  Once all BlePackets have been received, BleMessage reconstructs the 
original message and BleMessenger delivers this message to the calling application. 
3.4 Testing and Performance 
 A custom rudimentary benchmarking application was used to test connection 
distance and measure transfer speeds between a Moto E 4G LTE (Android 5.0.2) and a 
Nexus 5 (Android 4.4.4).  Basic transport mechanisms were implemented using 
CoreBluetooth on an iPad Mini (iOS 8.3) to demonstrate that iOS and Android can 
indeed communicate over BLE.  Initially the iOS LightBlue App [32] was used for 
Service and Characteristic exploration between the iPad Mini and the Moto E. 
 BLE advertises raw transfer rates of 1Mbps, with a maximum theoretical 
application throughput of 236.7 kbps [33], although testing in literature has only seen as 
much as 58 kbps using embedded devices [34].  The testing for this paper consistently 
yielded just under 10 kbps, significantly slower but enough to transfer a 100kB file in just 
over a minute [Figure A.2].  Proof of concept testing between the Moto E and the iPad 
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Mini resulted in similar throughput results.  This testing was made possible by adapting 
code from a previous project [27]. 
 Note that due to the asymmetric nature of BLE transfer, these results were 
achieved with the device in GAP Peripheral mode sending a payload to the device in 
GAP Central mode.  For transfers from a Central to Peripheral, throughput of just over 
2kbps was achieved.  This throughput, while not suitable for large payloads, is suitable 
for a small amount of data such as the transfer of encryption key information. 
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Chapter 4 – SimpBLE Public Interface 
 The goal of SimpBLE is to abstract out the cumbersome details of message 
transfer over Bluetooth Low Energy.  As such a calling application will only interface 
with the BleMessenger class.  BleMessenger exposes a short set of public methods and 
properties, and will relay information back to the calling application via several methods 
from a single registered callback. 
4.1 OS Resources 
 Because of how Android allocates handles to its resources, some of the lower 
level details must still be addressed by the calling application.  To implement BLE 
actions, the constructor for SimpBLE needs a pointer to the following Android system 
level resources: BluetoothManager, BluetoothAdapter, and Context..  
BluetoothManager btMgr = (BluetoothManager) 
 this.getSystemService(Context.BLUETOOTH_SERVICE); 
 
BluetoothAdapter btAdptr = btMgr.getAdapter(); 
 
Context ctx = this; 
 
To instantiate the BleMessage class, the application passes in handles to the 
BluetoothManager, BluetoothAdapter, the application’s context, and finally a callback to 
handle BleMessenger events.  
bleMessenger = new BleMessenger(btMgr, btAdptr, this, bleStatusCallback); 
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 For an Android application to perform Bluetooth operations and initiate device 
discovery, the following permissions must also be set in the AndroidManifest.xml file: 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH" /> 
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN" /> 
  The AndroidManifest.xml file must specify a minimum API level of 18.  
Scanning is more optimized in API levels 21 and above, however API levels 18 through 
20 offer scanning that proved to be functional and robust enough during testing to merit 
compatibility. 
<uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="18" android:targetSdkVersion="21" /> 
 
 
The application developer can decide whether or not to take certain actions depending on 
whether the device supports Peripheral (GATT Server) mode or not. 
if (bleMessenger.SupportsAdvertising) { 
 // perform actions based on whether or not this device can advertise 
} 
  
4.2 Connection Management 
 To look for peers, the application calls the ScanForPeers method, passing in the 
duration to scan in milliseconds.  SimpBLE will auto-connect to any detected device that 
advertises the Service definition specified in Section 3.1.  Whenever a device is 
connected to or its connection status updated, the callback peerConnectionStatus will be 
executed (detailed further down). 
bleMessenger.ScanForPeers(MillisecondsToScan); 
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To be found by another device which is actively scanning, the application makes a simple 
call to start advertising. 
bleMessenger.StartAdvertising(); 
 
When the application no longer wants to be visible to nearby devices, it makes a similar 
call to stop advertising. 
bleMessenger.StopAdvertising(); 
 
SimpBLE makes assumptions about certain advertising parameters such as power and 
duty cycle, and sets up the advertising functionality per the specifications in Section 3.1.  
Any connections made to the device are reported through the function 
peerConnectionStatus in the BleStatusCallback, regardless of which device initiated the 
connection. 
public void peerConnectionStatus(String remoteAddress, int ConnectionStatus) { 
 if (ConnectionStatus == BleMessenger.CONNECTION_NEGOTIATING) { 
  // negotiating connection with remoteAddress 
 } else if (ConnectionStatus == BleMessenger.CONNECTION_CONNECTED) { 
  // connected to remoteAddress 
 } else if (ConnectionStatus == BleMessenger.CONNECTION_DISCONNECTED) { 
  // disconnected from remoteAddress 
 } 
  
} 
 
Note that connection status of CONNECTION_CONNECTED refers to a connection at 
the SimpBLE abstraction level.  The devices are in fact connected at the GATT level 
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when SimpBLE reports CONNECTION_NEGOTIATING however the ability to send 
and receive data has not yet been finalized. 
 The calling application should maintain a collection of Bluetooth addresses 
passed in from the remoteAddress parameter in peerConnectionStatus , and can direct 
BleMessenger to disconnect from any of these. 
bleMessenger.disconnectPeer(BluetoothAddress); 
  
Once the connection has been terminated, the callback peerConnectionStatus is called 
with a ConnectionStatus of CONNECTION_DISCONNECTED. 
 
4.3 Sending a Message 
 When a device is connected, SimpBLE reports the connection back to the calling 
application along with the Bluetooth address of the remote device as a way for both 
SimpBLE and the calling application to keep track of peers.  The calling application will 
use this address as an index with which to reference a message recipient, allowing a 
message to be sent to a single peer while connected to multiple devices. 
 The calling application calls the AddMessage method, passing in the content of 
the outgoing message to BleMessenger as either an array of bytes or an instantiation of 
the abstract BleApplicationMessage helper class.  The AddMessage method returns a 
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truncated SHA-1 digest of the message bytes so the calling application can uniquely 
identify the message by content. 
bleMessenger.AddMessage(BluetoothAddress, ApplicationMessage); 
// or 
bleMessenger.AddMessage(BluetoothAddress, RawByteArray); 
 
 When a message is queued and a peer is connected, BleMessenger periodically 
checks for any messages that are pending send.  After sending the message, 
BleMessenger attempts to determine if a message was successfully delivered.  If so, it 
executes the BleStatusCallback function messageDelivered. 
public void messageDelivered(String remoteAddress, String payloadDigest, int 
 parentMessageId) { 
 // message identified by payloadDigest was delivered to remoteAddress 
} 
4.4 Receiving a Message 
 When a message is received in its entirety, the handleReceivedMessage method 
from the callback BleStatusCallback is executed.  If the application developer has been 
using a custom class derived from the provided BleApplicationMessage helper class, the 
details of the message can be easily rebuilt. 
public void handleReceivedMessage(String remoteAddress, int parentMessageId, 
 boolean messageIntact, byte[] MessageBytes) { 
 
 ApplicationMessage incomingMsg = new ApplicationMessage(); 
 String incomingDigest = incomingMsg.SetRawBytes(MessageBytes); 
     
 incomingMsg.BuildMessageDetails(); 
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 // assuming as single byte is used for the message type 
 int messageType = incomingMsg.MessageType & 0xFF; 
 
 // who’s supposed to get it, who sent it, what does the message contain 
 byte[] recipientFingerprint = incomingMsg.RecipientFingerprint; 
 byte[] senderFingerprint = incomingMsg.SenderFingerprint; 
 byte[] messagePayload = incomingMsg.MessagePayload; 
 byte[] messageHash = incomingMsg.BuildMessageMIC(); 
} 
4.5 Usage By a Calling Application 
 Earlier the use case of a two friends exchanging a photo between an Android and 
iOS device was presented.  An application that implements this with SimpBLE could be 
as simple as loading the image into a raw byte array, two devices connecting, and one 
device sending the byte array to the other. 
 If the information is more sensitive than (for instance) a photo suitable for social 
media, an application may choose to offer authentication and encryption.  In this case a 
pairing mechanism will need to be implemented as well as a layer of encryption.  Sample 
implementations for these layers are detailed in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 5 – Secure Message Passing Application 
 In Chapter 2 the use case of one friend needing to send the other a non-sensitive 
message via peer to peer transport between heterogeneous platforms was posited.  For 
situations like these an application may not implement security, however for more 
sensitive information authentication and encryption may be required.  This chapter 
presents a sample application to illustrate how a developer may use SimpBLE to 
implement a custom security layer. 
5.1 Authentication and Encryption 
 This particular application relies on Public/Private key authentication and 
encryption, as well as symmetric key encryption.  When a message is prepared for 
sending, the plaintext of the original message is encrypted with symmetric key encryption 
and the ciphertext sent to the recipient.  The symmetric key itself is then encrypted with 
the recipient’s public key and sent to the recipient in a separate message. 
5.1.1 Key Exchange 
 The application requires that an RSA key pair is generated and stored on each 
device.  This implementation on Android uses the Android Keystore Provider, which 
identifies this application via a random UUID written to the installation directory of the 
app. 
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 For an installation, the application will generate an Identity message of type 
ApplicationMessage (an instantiation of the abstract BleApplicationMessage helper class 
presented in chapter 4) with the fields detailed below. 
 
Figure 5.1 - Application Message Class 
 
Message Type is used to indicate the type of message being sent.  In this case the 
meessage type is 0x01, indicating an identity message. 
SenderFingerprint is used to identify the sender of the message and is always the SHA-
1 digest of the sender’s Public Key (20 bytes). 
RecipientFingerprint is used to identify the recipient of the message and is generally the 
SHA-1 digest of the recipient’s Public Key.  In the case of an Identity message no 
specific recipient is necessary, thus this field is the byte 0x00 repeated 20 times. 
Payload is the data destined for the message recipient.  In this case, the payload is the 
sender’s Public Key. 
 To begin the identity exchange process, each user starts the app on their phones.  
User A advertises connectability and User B scans for User A’s phone.   The two phones 
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connect over BLE and each user is notified the app is ready to exchange data.  Each user 
pushes a button to queue an identity message and passes it to SimpBLE, which relays the 
message to the other device. 
 Upon receipt of an identity message, a screen pops up on each device, displaying 
a hex representation of the other party’s Public Key along with a hex representation of a 
SHA1 fingerprint of the Public Key (Figure 5.3).   The users confirm each others’ 
fingerprints by voice using the first 4 to 8 hex octets.  Each user enters in a friendly name 
to identify the other person (Figure 5.2).  These values are saved into the application’s 
SQLite database. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Identity Exchange, Manual Authentication 
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Figure 5.3 - Identity Exchange, Implemented on Android 
 
 Alternatively the public keys and fingerprints could be exchanged beforehand – 
for instance via secure email - and copy/pasted directly into the Add Friend dialog.  The 
friends have now authenticated to each other and can trust that the friendly name stored 
in the application corresponds to their friend’s device. 
5.1.2 Encrypted Message Transfer 
 Once the application has a friend’s Public Key and Fingerprint stored in its 
database, a user can author a message and specify that friend as a recipient.  
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Figure 5.4 - Queue Message and Encrypt for Sending 
 
Queueing a message.  To require encryption for a message, the user checks a box when 
authoring a message.  The body of the message is stored in the SQLite database as plain 
text.  When the peers reconnect and identify each other, the database is queried for any 
messages queued for the connected peer.  If the message found for the connected peer 
requires encryption, the system will encrypt the original message and create an additional 
message providing the encryption key used to encrypt the original message. 
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Encrypting and sending the message.  The system will generate a one-time random 256 
bit AES key and a one-time random 128 bit Initialization Vector (IV).  The message 
plaintext, AES key, and IV are provided to a simple implementation of the javax.crypto 
library [35] to generate the message ciphertext.  The IV is then prepended to the 
encrypted ciphertext to create an encrypted payload which is sent to the message 
recipient.  
 
Encrypting and sending the key.  The app then takes the AES key used to generate the 
ciphertext and RSA encrypts it by using the Public Key stored for the message recipient.   
This encrypted key is then appended to a SHA-1 digest of the original message and sent 
to the message recipient. 
 
Receiving and decrypting the key.  The message recipient decrypts the key message 
payload using the Private Key corresponding to the Public Key that was used to 
authenticate with the message sender, and stores that decrypted symmetric key in a Map 
indexed by the digest of the plaintext message. 
 
Receiving and decrypting the message.  The message recipient stores the AES-
encrypted payload in another Map indexed by the hash of the plaintext message.  The 
receiving application then uses the digest of the received message to look up the 
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previously decrypted AES key.  If it exists, then the AES key is pulled and used to 
decrypt the payload, which is then displayed in plain text to the user. 
 
Figure 5.5 - Receipt and Decryption of AES Key and Original Message 
 
5.1.3 SQLite Data Objects 
 To support static data between application sessions should the application be 
terminated before a message can be sent, the SQLite library is used (available on Android 
and iOS).  As this is a fairly trivial system for demonstration, only two tables are needed 
whose relationships are noted in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6 - ER Diagram, Messages and Friends 
 
Friends.  The Friends table stores a peer’s Public Key, the Public Key’s Fingerprint as a 
hex string, and a friendly name for a user’s Friend.  The _id field is unique per row and is 
used to simplify row-level operations. 
 
Messages.  The Messages table stores incoming and outgoing messages.  The message 
type is stored to indicate whether or not this message will be encrypted.  The message 
content is stored in plaintext, while the friendly name of the recipient allows the system 
to look up recipient details from the Friends table.  A hex representation of the recipient’s 
fingerprint is stored (in case this message passes through an intermediary), and a SHA-1 
signature of the message’s payload provides unique message identification. 
5.2 Summary of Message Passing Application 
 The authentication mechanism presented in this implementation has several 
advantages over the traditional Bluetooth pairing mechanism provided by common 
mobile phone operating systems. 
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• The app does not cede control.  Since the application manages the pairing and 
does not have to cede control to the operating system’s pairing mechanism, the 
user is  never forced to leave the application to interact with a separate dialog. 
• The authentication step can happen beforehand.  In the case that two users 
have already authenticated each others’ Public Keys,  the users can add each these 
Public Keys manually into the application with no loss in trust. 
• The keys can be moved to a different device.  While the sample application 
does not have a mechanism to move keys to a different device, this functionality 
is supported by virtue of the key store being separate from the authentication 
mechanism itself.  
Along with flexibility in security comes some vulnerability.  Because the key data is not 
maintained and protected at the OS level, the possibility of surrendering this key to a 
malicious actor may be more likely.  Also note that this implementation does not ensure 
that the connected peer actually owns the private key for the recipient’s public key.  This 
shortcoming is mitigated somewhat in that regardless of who gets the message, only the 
holder of the private key can decrypt the message.  While this may be a problem for 
highly secure messages, this enables other devices to act as middle men to help deliver a 
message securely to its ultimate destination. 
 The overhead added by this encryption strategy in terms of computation 
complexity is negligible.  On the Moto E 4G LTE device (Android 5.0.2) used for testing, 
AES encryption of a 100KB message required 8ms to complete.  Decryption of the 
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100KB payload on the receiving device (Nexus 5, Android 4.4.4) required 14ms to 
complete.  RSA encryption of the 32 byte key requires around 2ms to complete, while 
RSA decryption of the 32 byte key averaged around 80ms. 
 In terms of message complexity, the primary overhead is due to the addition of a 
separate key message.  This overhead is mitigated somewhat due to the small size of the 
key message itself (just over 256 bytes assuming a 2048 bit RSA key), allowing this 
message to be transferred in just over a second.  Also note that AES encryption does not 
increase message size [36], so the increase in size of transferred messages is negligible.  
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Chapter 6 – Distribution of Secret Shares 
 A novel use case for an environment rich in wireless peer to peer connectivity is 
that of a mobile threshold secret sharing scheme.  A threshold secret sharing scheme is a 
way of splitting up a message such that the original message cannot be reconstructed 
without a pre-determined minimum number of shares; Adi Shamir presented the first 
implementation of such a scheme [37].  Note that with Shamir’s scheme, each share must 
be the size of the original message. 
6.1 Motivating Scenarios 
 Group Trust.  A parent has three children, each who have a smartphone.  The 
parent wants each child to have access to money in case of an emergency but does not 
trust any child individually.   The parent gives the oldest child a PIN operated ATM card, 
but not the PIN.  Instead he uses a smartphone application that splits the PIN into 3 
shares, where a minimum of 2 shares is needed to reconstruct the original PIN.  He gives 
each child’s device a single share, ensuring that at least 2 children must confer in order to 
rebuild the PIN. 
 Untrusted Couriers. A message sender needs to get a message to a recipient in 
an area without infrastructure and cannot deliver the message personally.  The sender and 
recipient do not share any encryption keys, symmetric or otherwise.  The sender uses a 
smartphone application to split up a short message into 5 secret shares such that any 3 are 
needed to rebuild it.  The application transmits a single share each onto smartphones 
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possessed by 5 separate message couriers.  As long as only 2 of these couriers collude to 
attempt to rebuild the message and at  least 3 of the couriers make it to the recipient and 
are able to relay their 3 shares, the message can be delivered securely. 
 Dead Drop.   If a message sender and recipient cannot meet in person, the sender 
drops a message off at a pre-determined location with the expectation that the recipient 
will retrieve the message.  As recent as 2006, Russian intelligence agents observed agents 
for the British government using a dead drop to gather information from Russian 
informants; the dead drop was a wireless receiver and transmitter hidden in a fake rock 
[38].  The scenario below presents a mobile and distributed dead drop implementation 
that overcomes the vulnerability in having a dead drop at only a single location. 
 Alice needs to deliver a message to Bob, however Alice and Bob are both being 
tracked and cannot risk being seen together.  Neither can communicate using 
infrastructure as the email accounts and internet access of both are being tracked.  Alice 
loads an application on her smartphone and splits a message into three secret shares, 
requiring a threshold of two shares to reconstruct the message.  Alice goes to a coffee 
shop and surreptitiously drops a share onto the shop’s peer to peer electronic message 
board.  She then goes to a different part of the city and drops another share onto an 
untrusted courier’s phone inside a crowded shopping mall.  On her way back to her 
apartment she stops by a sports bar and drops off a final share at the electronic message 
board at that location.  A few hours later, Bob travels to an as-yet unvisited location 
where he knows the courier will be and picks up a share from that courier, then travels to 
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the original coffee shop and retrieves a second share of the message.  Bob then 
reconstructs the original message using the application on his phone. 
 Section 6.2 describes an Android implementation of such an application. 
6.2 System Design 
 As with the encrypted message transfer from the previous section, the 
functionality described in this section is meant to show an application of a particular 
cryptographic technique using Bluetooth Low Energy as a peer to peer transport between 
wireless devices.  The database and object design in this section are identical to the 
previous chapter. 
6.2.1 Creating a Message 
 For this type of message the application need not identify a particular recipient as 
the final recipient is any peer who gains the minimum number of shares needed to rebuild 
the original message.  The application prompts the user for the number of shares to 
generate as well as the threshold number of shares needed to recreate the message.  The 
user also enters an identifying topic name for the message, which is used in place of the 
recipient name.  The type of message is stored as “topic”.  
 The plaintext of the message is not stored in the database.  Instead the application 
uses an adapted version of a Java implementation to generate secret shares [39], and 
stores each of these shares as an individual message.  The content of each message is 
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such that the first character indicates the number of shares required to rebuild the 
message (1-9).  The second character indicates which share number a particular message 
is.   The next 40 characters are a hexadecimal representation of a SHA-1 signature of the 
original plaintext, and the remaining characters are a hexadecimal representation of  the 
share itself.  Figure 6.1 details a message generated with 5 total shares, any 2 of which 
are required to rebuild the original message.  The message was authored on a Moto E 4G 
LTE running Android 5.0.2.  
 
Figure 6.1 - Creating a Shared Secret 
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6.2.2 Distributing a Message 
 Upon connecting, the peers perform the identification handshake to exchange 
public keys, as detailed in Chapter 5.  The sending application then checks to see if a 
share for this message has already been sent to the connected peer.  If not, the originating 
application sends a share to that device and stores this peer’s fingerprint to disallow 
subsequent deliveries of message shares to that peer.  In the presented example, two 
shares were delivered, one each to a Galaxy Nexus (custom build of Android 5.1) and a 
Nexus 5 (Android 5.1) 
6.2.3 Re-assembling a Message 
 The particular implementation tested for this paper assumes that any peer who has 
not already received a share is interested in receiving an unsent share.  Upon receipt of a 
share message, the application stores the received message in the Messages table.  The 
user can then view the received shares and pick any share for the secret message, then 
instruct the application to Combine Shares.  If enough have been received then the 
original message is displayed on the device as shown in Figure 6.2. 
 To re-assemble the message, the application was removed and freshly installed 
onto the Moto E 4G LTE to create the appearance of a new peer.  This step was necessary 
due to the number of devices required to test multiple peers in this simulation.  This 
device then connected to each of the other two tested devices to gather the shares that 
were originally dropped off.   The shares were reconstructed as shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2 - Reassembling a Message 
6.3 Future Work 
 Using Shamir’s original scheme, each share is the size of the secret message 
itself.  While Shamir’s scheme is theoretically secure, computationally secure 
implementations have been presented which will allow for each share to be smaller than 
the original secret [40], allowing for larger messages to be created. 
 If social media location based apps become more prevalent and electronic peer to 
peer bulletin boards become popular, a share can be dropped in the open and cloaked by 
using popular topics, such as sports teams’ names.  The sending application can also use 
GPS to ensure that it doesn’t drop off more than one share at a physical location. 
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Chapter 7 – Implications and Future Work 
 Enabling iOS and Android devices to communicate via an easy to implement peer 
to peer standard opens the doors for a wide variety of applications from mobile 
application developers, both in the private sector and in academia.  To facilitate 
application development, a formal GATT Profile for arbitrary message transfer can be 
presented to the Bluetooth SIG and adopted as an implementable standard.  All code for 
this project is available on GitHub at https://github.com/ludwigmace/blebenchmark [41] 
and can be used freely.  The next most logical step is to re-implement the full SimpBLE 
framework on iOS and not just the rudimentary transport mechanisms used for testing. 
 Without the requirement for OS level pairing and peer to peer capabilities 
between Android and iOS made possible, the modeling of message passing routines for 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) can be simplified and greatly increase a potential 
testing population.  Test subjects may also be more willing to install these apps as the 
battery drain from Bluetooth Low Energy is much less than from Classic Bluetooth. 
 The recently adopted specification for Bluetooth 4.2 increases the raw BLE 
packet sizes are from 27 bytes to 251 bytes.  This mirrors the ability of iOS 8 and 
Android 5 to negotiate an MTU size larger than the maximum packet size specified in the 
Bluetooth 4.0 specification.  With this change alone transfer speeds may become fast 
enough for much higher throughput and expand MANET capabilities. 
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 This paper and implemented applications have demonstrated that Bluetooth Low 
Energy provides a suitable peer to peer transport method for small amounts of arbitrary 
data between modern smartphones.  With the planned capabilities of Bluetooth Low 
Energy in future specifications and the rising ubiquity of consumer devices offering BLE 
capabilities, reliable and commonplace peer to peer networking is on the horizon. 
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Appendix A – Testing Applications 
 
Figure A.1 – Kevo Android Service and Characteristics 
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Figure A.2 - Benchmark App on Nexus 5 (4.4.4) 
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